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Ethnicity, Assimilation and Harassment in the Labor Market 
 
We often observe minority ethnic groups at a disadvantage relative to the majority. Why is 
this and what can be done about it? Efforts made to assimilate, and time, are two elements 
working to bring the minority into line with the majority. A third element, the degree to which 
the majority welcomes the minority, also plays a role. We develop a simple theoretical model 
useful for examining the consequences for assimilation and harassment of growth in the 
minority population, time, and the role of political institutions. Over time, conflicts develop 
within the minority group as members exhibit different interests in assimilating and in 
maintaining their cultural identity. We discuss how this affects the minority’s position over 
time and the influence of public policy. 
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Minority ethnic group participation in labor markets is quite complex and in many 
ways different from that of citizens belonging to a nation’s majority ethnicity. Studies 
of minorities around the world show, with few exceptions, that they tend to earn 
wages substantially below those of comparable majority workers (Altonji and Blank 
1999, Blau and Kahn, 1997, 2006, 2007, Smith and Welch, 1989, Bhaumik, Gang and 
Yun, 2006). Partly, this reflects a failure on the part of the minority group to 
undertake the effort to assimilate with the majority (Constant, Gataullina and 
Zimmermann, 2008). “Lack of effort” can arise from the desire to maintain a cultural 
heritage or separate identity which would be lost or reduced if the group assimilated.  
The failure to take active steps to assimilate can also arise in the face of high 
adjustment costs, such as inadequate language skills, intergenerational familial 
conflicts, and, in the case of immigrants, lack of knowledge about the host country 
labor market (Chiswick and Miller, 1995, 1996, Bauer, Epstein and Gang, 2005). Yet 
for immigrants and their descendants, as length of time in the host country increases, 
assimilation generally creeps in and various immigrant labor market indicators 
approach those of comparable majority workers. On occasion, minority workers 
outperform majority workers (Chiswick, 1977, Deutsch, Epstein and Lecker, 2006). 
Efforts made to assimilate, and time, are two elements working to bring 
minorities into line with the majority.  A third element, the degree to which the 
majority welcomes the minority, also plays a role.  Often, the majority is less than 
welcoming, blaming the minority for depressing wages and displacing majority 
workers – i.e., causing majority unemployment. This presumption has very strong 
policy implications and is implicit, for example, in the calls for increased regulation 
of immigration heard worldwide. Yet, there is mixed evidence on the impact of 
minorities on majority wages and employment – it depends on whether they are 
substitutes or complements with respect to the skills and other attributes they bring to 
the labor market (Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994, Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun 2002). 
Whether minorities actually lower wages and increase employment, or not, the 
perception exists that they do so.  Because of this perception the majority may take 
active steps to discourage minority assimilation – discrimination, isolation, and so on.  
We refer to these majority activities as harassment. 
  2Often the efforts of the minority and the majority are mediated through 
political institutions. These institutions exist in both the minority and majority worlds.  
They could be, for example, political parties, trade organizations, unions, or thugs.  
These are organizations that are able to overcome the free-rider problem individual 
members of each group have in moving from the actions they desire to take, to 
actually taking the actions.  Yet, while an organization’s purpose may be to represent 
the members of their group, the interests’ of the organization and that of its members 
do no always coincide. Our work adds to the blossoming literature on majority – 
minority conflict and resolution, assimilation, and the reestablishment of cultural 
identity (see, for example, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, Anas, 2002, Bisin and 
Verdier, 2000, Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston, 2004, Kahanec, 2006, and Lazear, 
1999). 
We are interested in why minorities are so often at a disadvantage relative to 
the majority, the circumstances under which their status changes or stagnates over 
time, and role public policy can play.  Assimilation efforts by the minority, 
harassment by the majority and time are the three elements that determine how well 
the minority does in comparison to the majority.  We examine the consequences for 
these of increases in the numbers of members of the minority, time, and the role of the 
political entity.  We construct a model in which there are four actors:  the members of 
the majority and the organization that represents them, and members of the minority 
and the organization that represents them. Over time, the political entity representing 
the minority and the members of the minority exhibit different interests in 
assimilating and in maintaining their cultural identity.  We discuss how this affects the 




Consider a firm that uses two factors of production:  workers who are part of the 
majority, Ln, and workers who are members of a minority ethnic group, Lm.  For 
simplicity, we assume that there is only one ethnic minority.
1  W e  u s e  t h e  t e r m  
minority and majority in terms of power, for example, the whites in South Africa 
                                                 
1 We use the terms minority and majority to refer to both the groups as a whole and 
individual members of each group.
  3under apartheid are to be seen as the majority while the blacks are the minority.  We 
normalize the efficiency level of majority workers to unity; the minority’s 
productive/efficiency level equals  () () . Pr . g .  The two functions,  () . Pr . and g ( ) , play 
important roles in the determination of production and wages; aside from this 
distinction, labor is homogeneous.
2
  , where  , is a function of two elements: (1) The effort 
invested by the majority in order to prevent the minority  from assimilating into the 
majority. These activities include harassing members of the minority, not cooperating 
with them, discriminating against them, and so on (hereafter, "harassment").  Such 
activities decrease the minority’s productivity and thus their efficiency.
() . Pr () 1 . Pr 0 ≤ ≤
3  Denote the 
harassment level by h.  (2) The effort invested by the minority in assimilating.  These 
activities affect the minority's efficiency level positively.  The more the minority 
assimilates, its productivity increases, as cooperation increases between the majority 
and the minority. Denote assimilation activity by a.
4   
We further assume that over time, in a natural way, the minority assimilates or 
the majority gets used to them and views them more as equals (Chiswick, 1978, 
Duleep and Regets, 2002).  We therefore introduce an element of time into the 
minority’s productivity. Productivity increases with time, though it cannot be higher 
than the majority’s. Thus g(.) is such that for  1 ) ( 0 , 1 ≤ < ≥ t g t .
5  An example of such 






with e t g t .  In this example, over a long period of 
interaction between the minority and the majority,  , ∞ = t the time weight equals one 
unit,  .  For all other levels of t,  1 ) ( = t g , ∞ < t the weight is less than one,  .     1 ) ( < t g
    The productivity weight that the minorities receive equals g(.) .  This 
weight reflects the productivity and efficiency of the minority relative to the majority 
() . Pr
                                                 
2 Our results are even stronger if we allow diversity to increase productivity and/or 
efficiency. 
3 This is similar to the cooperation and harassment activities described in insider-
outsider theory (Lindbeck and Snower, 1998). 
T P
4 P T   Assimilation is not always beneficial for the minority; see Epstein (2003) for a 
discussion of migrant assimilation.  For now, we ignore such possibilities; we will 
return to discuss them later in this paper.  
5 If we allow the minority to be more productive/efficient than the majority, 
corresponding to the popular opinion about Asians and other groups in America, our 
results below will be more extreme. 
  4group, with the majority group investing in harassment activities and the minority 
investing in assimilation activities (a and h are positive).  We focus on the unique 
interior Nash equilibria.  The function  () . Pr  has the following properties:   
 




















greater than or 
less than zero.  
 
The representative firm's production function at time t ( ) 1 ≥ t is given by 
 
(2)      ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) m n t L a h t g L f L Q ., Pr + = ,    
 
such that    
  () () ( ) ( ) ()



































We assume decreasing returns to scale for labor.  Moreover, we assume that the third 










This assumption simplifies our calculations.  Below we show where this assumption 
is used and that it is not critical for our results.   
Let Wn   be the majority worker's wage, and Wm be the minority's wage. We 
assume that the wages the majority and minority receive equals their marginal product 
values.  We could assume that the majority workers have market power over their 
employers; this would not change our results.  
Normalizing the price of the product to unity, the profits of the firm are given 
by  
 
(3)      () () ( ) () ( ) m m n n m n L W L W L a h t g L f + − + = , Pr . π .  
 
The first order conditions for maximization are 
 
  5(4)     ()
n n
n
W f W f
L






and,     
(5)     () ( ) () ( ) () m m
m
W f a h t g W f a h t g
L
= ⇒ = − =
∂
∂
' , Pr 0 ' , Pr
. π . 
 
Equation (4) represents the wage condition for majority workers and (5) represents the 
wage condition for minority workers.   
 
Harassment and majority utility 
We specify the majority's utility quite simply as 
 
(6)     ,  () n n C u = .
 
where Cn is the majority's consumption level.  We assume that each worker consumes 
his entire income in each period; this means that the consumption level equals the 
majority's wage level (the price level is normalized to unity).  Therefore, 
 
(7)      () ( ) ( ) ( ) m n n n L a h t g L f C u , Pr ' . + = = .    
 
Utility is a positive function of harassment activities by the majority and a negative 
function of the assimilation activities by the minority.  Each of the majority 
individuals would want to invest in harassment activities, however, as a result of free 
riding it is not rational for each individual separately to do so. 
Now assume that there exists a political entity that represents the majority.  
The utility of this entity is a positive function of the worker’s utility,  .  The total 
quantity of harassment activity set by this political entity equals h.  Denote the utility 
of the political entity representing the majority by 
() . n u
() . N U .  The political entity is able 
to overcome the free rider problem. 
The political entity representing the majority, hereafter the “majority”, 
determines the level of harassment so as to maximize utility.  From (4) it is clear that 
increasing the level of harassment decreases the productivity level of the minority.  
  6This is similar to decreasing the labor force available to the firm, thus increasing the 
wage level of the majority.
6  
The majority can benefit from harassing the minority, as these activities will 
increase their own wages.  On the other hand, there is a cost to harassment that 
decreases the utility of the majority. 
One could also think of majority utility as increasing in the harassment level, 
as the majority may have positive utility just from harassment.  This may be the case 
for some in the majority group; however, overall we assume that it costs majority 
group to participate in harassment activities.  These activities take time and effort and 
thus decrease the utility of the majority.   The utility of the political entity 
representing the majority is thus a function of the majority representative agent and 
the level of harassment activities:  ( ) h u U n N , . To simplify we assume, using (4), (6) 




(8)     () ( ) ( ) ( ) h L t g a h L f U m n N − + = , Pr ' . , 
 
where  () ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( )
L
L t g a h L f






, Pr '  . 
 
The majority's objective is to maximize its utility by determining its optimal 
harassment level.  The first order condition determining the optimal harassment level 







U N , thus  
 










                                                 
6 We could also model the behavior of a second political entity, one that represents the 
interests of capital owners (the firm) in the majority.  The capital owners would react 
like the minority (since the minority decreases the firm’s marginal costs), so the 
results would not change. 
7 Assuming a general function such as  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) h L t g a h L f U m n N − + , Pr '  would not 
change the results. 
  7where   () ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 , Pr
, Pr ' '
L
L a h t g L f




= + . 
The first order condition therefore satisfies, 
 
(10)   ()
() ( ) () ( ) m n m n L L t g L a h t g L f h
a h













and  ( ) ( ) ( ) m n L t g a h L f , Pr ' ' +  are negative.  
In order for the harassment level determined in (9) to maximize the majority's 
utility, the second order condition must hold.  The second order condition for 









U N .  Thus, 
 
(11) 
() () ( ) () ( )
() () ( ) () ( ) . 0 , Pr ' ' '
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n m m n
L L t g L a h t g L f
h
a h
L L t g L a h t g L f
h
a h
    
Under the assumptions made above, see (2), the third derivative of the production 









.  This assumption 
simplifies matters; alternatively, it can be assumed that 
() () ( ) () ( )
2 2 2
2
, Pr ' ' '
, Pr











is very small or equals zero.   
The second order condition can thus be written as 
 












From (2) we know that  ( ) ( ) ( 0 , Pr ' ' ) < + m n L a h t g L f , so in order for the second 
order conditions to hold it must be that  
 





















  8 




Assimilation and minority utility  
The utility of the minority is of the same form of that of the majority.  We specify the 
minority’s utility function simply as 
 
(14)     ,  () m m C u = .
 
where  Cm is the minority’s consumption level.  We assume that each worker 
consumes his entire income in each period.  Therefore, 
 
(15)    ()( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) m n m m L a h t g L f a h t g W u , Pr ' , Pr . + = = .    
 
Utility is a negative function of harassment and a positive function of assimilation 
activities.  Each minority individual would want to invest in assimilation; however, 
while it is rational for all together to invest, as a result of free riding it is not rational 
for each individual separately to do so.
9
  Now assume that there exists a political entity that represents the minority and 
is able to overcome the free rider problem. The political entity might be a group 
representing minority rights, interests, and so on.  The utility of this entity is a positive 
function of the number of assimilated minority workers. Assimilation has many 
benefits for the minority group:  first, it increases their wages; second, if part of the 
minority assimilates, the benefits of their assimilation will provide the rest of the 
minority with benefits – this arises because the minority group can act as a network 
(Rauch, 2001); and third, for international traders such connections help in importing 
                                                 
8 In interpreting the level of assimilation "0" means not assimilation at all and "1" is 
full assimilation (identical to the local population).  The degree of assimilation affects 
both the wages of the minority and majority.  
9 It has been frequently noted that while people may hold prejudices about a group, 
often they do not hold these views about individuals from the group whom they know.  
The costly assimilation we refer to here is in terms of how the local population thinks 
of the minority as a group.  Individuals in the minority may benefit from, for example, 
learning the language and will be willing to invest. 
  9and exporting products at lower costs. In this last example, if the minority consists of 
a group of immigrants, as they assimilate into the host country, network externalities 
increase, enabling increased profits and increased imports, thus increasing the utility 
of the international importer (exporter) minority (in other words, there is an extra 
externality, see Epstein and Gang, 2006).  In general, the utility of the political entity 
representing the minority will be a function of the degree to which the minority 
population has assimilated into the majority,  ( ) ( ) m L a h t g , Pr .   
      Denote the utility of the political entity representing the minority by 
 such that,    () ( ) () a L a h t g U m M , , Pr
  
 
(16)     () ( ) ( ) ( ) a L a h t g R U m IM − = , Pr . .  
 
R(.) is the rent associated with the assimilation of the minority.  This level of 
assimilation is represented by the term  ( ) ( ) m L a h t g , Pr .  We assume that as the level 
of assimilation increases, () ( ) m L a h t g , Pr  increases, that is, the rent also increases.   
Some of the minority participates in assimilation activities and thus have a cost of a 
for each a unit of effort for the purpose of assimilating.   To simplify, we assume for 
now that the rent equals  ( ) ( ) () ( ) ( ) m L m a h t g r L a h t g R , Pr , Pr = .  Therefore, the 
utility of the political entity representing the minority group becomes 
 
(17)     () ( ) ( ) a L t g a h r U m M − = , Pr . .  
 
As assumed above, as assimilation activities increase  ( ) a h, Pr increases.  The first 







U M , 
namely, 
 





= ∆ r L t g
a
a h
m M . 
 
The first order condition is satisfied if   
  10 
(19)     ()

















, see (1).   In order to insure that the 









U M .  
Therefore, it must also hold that 
 












           In other words, (20) assumes that there are decreasing returns to investing in 
assimilation.  From (19) we can conclude that, 
 
Increasing the size of the minority, or the rent associated with assimilation, r, will, 
given the level of harassment, increase the level of assimilation.  Moreover, over time, 
the minority will invest more effort in assimilating. 
 
The political entity representing the minority seeks aggregate rents as described 
above, not rents per capita.  Thus for this political entity, growth of the minority 
population wanting to assimilate is the same as increasing rents. Rising rents increase 
the benefits for the minority political entity and thus increase the entity’s returns to 
investing in assimilation.  With time, the minority naturally integrates into the 
majority; increasing assimilation efforts speeds up the process. 
 
Equilibrium  
  The majority group invests in harassment and the minority invests in 
assimilation (a and h are positive).  We focus on the unique interior Nash equilibria.  
We now wish to consider the effects changes in the size of the minority (rents to the 
minority’s political entity) have on the equilibrium levels of harassment and 
assimilation efforts. 
  11By differentiation of the first order conditions (see (8) and (18)), the Nash 
equilibrium effort levels satisfy the following conditions for L=LF, 
 
(21) 
h a a h
L a L a
L
h
M N M N

























(22)              
a h h a
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From (8) and (18) we obtain 
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f r L L t g H m n .  



































Sign ,   H > 0.   
 
The ability of the minority to convert its assimilation efforts into productivity 
and efficiency can be represented by the marginal effect of a change in the minority’s 
assimilation effort on the marginal productivity effect,  ()
a ∂
∂ . Pr
 (where  ). 
By assumption, this marginal productivity effect is declining with the minority’s own 
assimilation efforts. Changes in assimilation efforts also affect, however, the 
majority’s marginal productivity level. The minority has an advantage in terms of 
ability if a change in majority’s effort positively affects the minority’s marginal 
productivity level.  In other words, a positive (negative) sign of the cross second-order 
partial derivative of Pr( , 





), , ( a h
, implies that the minority  has an advantage 
(disadvantage) when majority group  makes efforts to harass the minority  change. For 
a given combination of efforts   the ratio between the effect of a change in the 
minority’s effort on the marginal productivity level and the effect of a change in 














                                                
, is a measure of the asymmetry between the 
abilities of both groups to affect the minority’s productivity level.
10  In the same way 
one can calculate the measure of asymmetry in terms of the other group.   
 




10 P   For a general discussion on how effort activities are transferred from effort to 
performance see Epstein and Nitzan (2006, 2007). 
  13Lemma 1 
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  By Lemma 1 (a), if the contestants are symmetric in equilibrium in terms of 
their abilities, then growth in the minority population will increase both harassment 
and assimilation efforts.  
  By Lemma 1 (b), if the majority group has an advantage, as defined above, 
over the minority population, then growth in the minority population will increase 
harassment; however it is not clear what will happen to the level of assimilation 


















h a , and the ratio between the effects of the marginal efficiency of their 
investment,
r
L f n ' '
.   The main idea here is that even though harassment activities 
increase, the majority is so strong that it may not be worthwhile for the minority to try 
to fight the majority.  Therefore, the minority may well decrease its efforts to 
assimilate.  This will depend on what each group can gain from such activities. 
  By Lemma 1 (c), if the minority has an advantage over the majority, then an 
increase in the minority population will increase assimilation activities, however it is 
not clear what will happen to the level of harassment activities.  This ambiguity 

















h a , and the 





Recall our assumption f'''=0, so when increasing  , f'' doesn’t change and thus the 
ratio decreases.  Thus the relative advantage of the minority decreases, while it 
increases for the majority. 
n L
As we described earlier, we define the majority to be the strong group.  It does 
not have to be the biggest group.  Therefore, we assume that the majority is the 








.  We conclude that, 
 











































Growth in the minority population, given that the majority group is relatively 
stronger, increases the majority’s harassment of the minority.  As the minority’s 
population grows, efforts to assimilate on the part of the minority will increase if the 
measure of the asymmetry between the abilities of both groups to affect the minority’s 
productivity exceeds the ratio between the effects of the marginal efficiency of their 
investments on their rents.  Here it “pays” for the minority not to give up in the face 
of greater harassment, but to fight instead and further their assimilation.  Similarly, if 
the measure of the asymmetry between the abilities of both groups to affect the 
minority’s productivity is less than the ratio between the effects of the marginal 
efficiency of their investments on their rents, the minority will not find it worthwhile 
to fight the majority population and will reduce its assimilation efforts as its 
population increases. As the minority’s population grows, assimilation efforts by the 
minority will decrease if the majority population is so strong that it is worthwhile for 
the minority to try to fight the majority.  Therefore, the minority may well decrease its 
efforts to assimilate.  This will depend on what each group can gain from such 
activities. 
Let us now consider how a change in the rent received by the political entity 
representing the minority population, r, affects the level of harassment against the 
  15minority and its assimilation efforts. As presented above in (21) and (22), 
differentiating of the first order conditions (see (8) and (18)), the Nash equilibrium 
effort levels satisfy the following conditions,  
 
(25)       
h a a h
r a r a
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where H is defined in equation (23). 
 


































Increasing the rent associated with assimilation efforts increases assimilation 
activities by the minority.  However, it is not clear what will happen to harassment 








, then increasing rents associated with assimilation decreases 
  16harassment.
11  The idea here is that the minority has a lot more to gain from its 
assimilation activities relative to what the majority can obtain and, at the same time, it 
can have an advantage in turning effort into efficiency.  These two elements will 
cause the minority to increase its assimilation activities, while they will decrease the 
majority's harassment efforts. 
  With the majority as the strong population we obtain 
 
Proposition 2: Increasing the rent associated with assimilation activities will 

















  Let us now consider how time affects assimilation activities.  Will we see 
greater or fewer assimilation and harassment efforts over time?  As g(t) is increasing 
in  t, we look at the effect of changes in g(t) on the levels of harassment and 
assimilation activities. Use (21) and (22) for L=g(t) and the fact that (recall  f'''=0), 
 
 (28)      ()
n m





















By substituting (28) and (2) into (21) and (22) and using the first order conditions (9) 



























































                                                 
11 Effort refers to activities such as assimilation and harassment, while ability tells us 
how effort translates into outcomes – does one unit of effort give us one percent or ten 
percent of the desired outcome 
  17  From (29) we have, 
 
Lemma  3 





















































































































By Lemma 3(a), if the contestants are symmetric in equilibrium in terms of their 
abilities then over time the majority group increases its harassment activities and the 
minority increases its assimilation activities.  By Lemma 3(b) if the majority group 
has an advantage over the minority, then over time harassment activities increase, 
however, it is not clear what happens to assimilation efforts.  By Lemma 3(c) if the 
minority has an advantage (in turning effort into performance) over the majority, then 
over time assimilation activities increase, however, it is not clear what happens to the 
level harassment efforts.  The reasons for these results are the same type of reasons 
presented after Lemma 1. 
 
Given that the majority population is the stronger group we obtain: 
 
Proposition 3: Harassment will increase over time while assimilation efforts may 



































  18  
A more general model of assimilation 
Now let us return to the political entity representing the minority population.  Assume 
that assimilation has two different types of effects on the utility of an individual:  (1) 
it increases the wages of the individual and, (2) it decreases the utility of the 
individual as he is losing his identity and uniqueness.
12 Therefore, we rewrite the 
utility of the entity in the following way: 
 
(30)     () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) a L t g a h L t g a h R U m m IM − − = , Pr 1 , , Pr . .  
 
The first component is the number of assimilated minority members, while the second 
component in the number of non-assimilated minority members. Increasing any of 
these components increases the utility of the minority’s political entity:  
 
(31)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) ()
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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. 0
, Pr 1
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L t g a h
L t g a h L t g a h R
and
L t g a h
L t g a h L t g a h R
   
The objective of the minority’s political entity is to maximize its utility by 
determining the level of assimilation activities.
13  The first order condition is: 
 
(32)  () ()
() ( ) ()
()
() () ( ) ()
( )( ) ( )
a
L t g a h
L t g a h
R
























. . . 
 
In the case we described above it is clear that we were only talking about the first 
component of (32). 
  Under this more generalized case, it is clear that if  ( ) a h, Pr =1 then the benefit 
to an individual will be low (and for the political entity it will be zero and it will not 
have any reason to exist).  Therefore, if the level of assimilation is sufficiently high 
                                                 
12 Another way of thinking about this is from the political entity's view: this group’s 
existence is a function of harassment and the minority’s failure to undertake effective 
assimilation activities.  In order for the political entity to survive it needs to help those 
it represents and at the same time ensure that they still need its services.  If all 
members of the minority fully assimilate then there will be no role for this political 
entity. 
13  We continue to assume the utility of the majority’s political entity is monotonic.   
  19then the assimilated individuals will want to invest in resisting assimilation so as to 
differ from the local population, thus holding on to their heritage and traditions.  
Assume for t=t*  the assimilation activity that maximizes (32) equals  .  
Over time, as the assumed level of assimilation increases, if the level of harassment in 
time   t=t*+1 equals the level of harassment activities at time t=t*, then it is clear that 
the level of assimilation activities of those who have already assimilated will decrease 
from time period t=t* to period t=t*+1.  Namely,  .  In other words it may 
well be the case that after a certain period of time the level of assimilation activities 
will decrease.   Let us now return to the minority worker.  Given (5), minority 
workers who have a low level of assimilation will always want to invest effort in 
assimilation activities while it is not clear that the political entity that represents all 
the minority will always want to do so.  Moreover, if the level of assimilation is 
sufficiently high, it may well be the case that the minority worker will continue 
investing in assimilation activities while the political entity will invest in anti-
assimilation activities, for example, preserving the heritage of the minority group, etc. 
These activities are aimed at preserving home country traditions and emphasizing the 






* * + >
t t a a
We conclude therefore that, 
 
Proposition 4  
There exists an inverse U-shaped relationship between the rent obtained from 
assimilation activities and time for the political entity representing the minority. With 
time the majority will continue to invest in harassment activities against the minority, 
whereas the members of the minority who have low levels of assimilation will invest in 
assimilation activities while those with a high level assimilation will invest in anti-
assimilation activities.  The political entity representing the minority will increase its 
assimilation activities until a certain point in time, t, and beyond this time will 
decrease assimilation activities and may even invest in anti-assimilating activities 
(a1<0).  
  
This proposition states that the members of the minority benefit from assimilation and 
will invest (as much as they can given free rider problems, etc.) in assimilation 
activities.  Denote the minority’s members assimilation activities by a2 > 0.  At the 
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and thus will increase their investment in assimilation activities. Over time, after t, 
the political entity benefits less from assimilation of the minority group as its 
members are becoming more and more assimilated.  As a result, after period t 
assimilation activities by political entity decrease and may even become negative.  
Negative assimilation activities can be thought of as anti-assimilation activities (these 
activities of the political entity are denoted by a1<0), and include activities aimed at 
preserving home country traditions and emphasizing the differences between the 
majority population and the minorities. At the same time the majority population will 
continue harassing the minorities, while individual members continue to invest in 
assimilation activities.  
  It may well be the case that as the members of the minority continue in their 
assimilation activities after a level of a2
* (see figure) and the political entity will invest 
effort in anti-assimilation activities, so that a1 becomes negative (see figure).   Thus 
we will see that the political entity is fighting to prevent assimilation or at least full 
assimilation while the members of the minority that have low levels of assimilation 
fight to increase assimilation.  Both the majority population and political entity will be 
fighting assimilation and the members of the minority with low levels of assimilation 
will be fighting to increase assimilation.  Over time, therefore, we may well see that 
the political entity raises assimilation efforts and fights harassment, but after a certain 
point they go against their fellow country-men and decrease assimilation activities, 
even engaging in anti-assimilation activities to hold on to their rent and not let the 
minority fully assimilate into the host country.  
 
Public policy implications and concluding remarks 
This paper analyses a game theoretic model of ethnic competition between the 
majority in a country and the minority. To surmount certain public good problems in 
the generation of harassment and assimilation activities, “lobbying” organizations 
form to carryout these activities. We generate equilibrium harassment and 
assimilation activities, derive optimum time paths for these activities, and derive a 
potential for conflicts of interests between migrant organizations and their members. 
This potential conflict is acute between both the majority and the minority, and within 
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2005).   Here we further speculate about policy implications. 
  Our picture of assimilation is highly simplified – with time and effort the 
minority assimilates into majority culture until there is no differentiation in terms of 
consumption preferences or wages.  The majority group harasses the ethnic minority 
to forestall and prevent this, or at least to keep the gains from the process out of the 
hands of the minority.  Over time it is assumed that, in a natural way, the minority 
assimilates or the majority gets used to them and sees them more as equals. While 
highly simplified, the model allows us to obtain insights that are useful for 
understanding richer assimilation stories (Bun and Kiong, 1993, Gang and 
Zimmermann, 2000, Gradstein and Schiff, 2006, Gradstein and Justman, 2005, 
Rapoport and Weiss, 2003).   The intensity of assimilation activities by the minority 
and harassment activities by the majority generally depends on how symmetric the   
minority and majority are in terms of their abilities, and their relative marginal 
efficiency of investment in these activities. We also consider dissention within the 
minority ethnicity, where some in the minority group may reject assimilation in favor 
of maintaining elements of their cultural identity, while other members of the 
minority may still be struggling to assimilate.  
  Our model further captures the role of political institutions.  There are an 
abundance of real world examples.  In the United States prominent organizations have 
included NAACP, HIAS, the Anti-Catholic League, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK).  In 
Europe, frequently political parties take either pro- or anti-immigrant positions.   
Moreover, there may be multiple competing organizations.  Above (footnote 6) we 
pointed to the possibility of a second political entity, one that represents the interests 
of capital owners (the firm) in the majority.  The capital owners would react like the 
minority (since the minority decreases the firm’s marginal costs), so the results would 
not change.  As a very real example in the United States, very recently the National 
African American Tobacco Prevention Network broke with other minority groups and 
opposed the passage of particular anti-smoking legislation which it viewed as too 
weak. 
  If the minority is an immigrant group our paper shows the effect of increased 
migration on both assimilation and harassment.  As the size of the minority increases, 
assimilation and the effort to assimilate will increase. Moreover, generally growth in 
the minority increases harassment by the majority.  If the groups are very asymmetric 
  22it will pay for the minority to fight harassment and further their assimilation.   
However, the minority will give up on assimilation if the asymmetry between the 
abilities of both groups to affect the minority’s productivity is less than the ratio 
between the effects of the marginal efficiency of their investments on their rents.  
Moreover, if the majority is so strong and united against the minority, the minority 
will also give up in its attempt to assimilate. 
  Our paper also discusses several aspects of the role of time in assimilation and 
harassment, and raises several questions with regard to what is generally thought 
about the process of assimilation.  The conventional wisdom is that the experiences of 
migrants to America (where there have been several waves of migrants from different 
areas is that assimilation activities and harassment peak early and trail off with time. 
For example, the outcaste Catholic immigrants of the early twentieth century are now 
fully accepted into American society. Many have become prominent politicians and 
business people, and their children, grandchildren and great grandchildren mix freely 
with other ethnicities in suburban school districts. There is no harassment of these 
groups, and assimilation is complete. In fact, many of them have now become natives, 
in the sense of our model, who may carry out harassment activities against other 
minorities such as African Americans (in Northern cities), Hispanics, Asians and 
Middle Easterners. 
We might also ask how a simple tax-subsidy policy would affect assimilation 
and harassment.  For example, can assimilation be expedited and harassment impeded 
if a benevolent planner simply taxed the majority wage and transferred it as a subsidy 
to the minority workers, since the incentive for harassment by majority workers is to 
increase their wages at the expense of the minority group? Unfortunately, taxing the 
majority may have opposing affects.  Imposing taxes may increase harassment since 
wages of the majority have decreased and as a result the majority will want to 
substitute for the decrease by increasing harassment and thus increasing wages. On 
the other hand, imposing taxes and transferring them to the minority will decrease the 
minority assimilation activities that may in equilibrium decrease harassment. A 
different possibility would be to impose a tax on the minority and transferring it to the 
majority. This may decrease harassment and increase assimilation. 
Our paper adds to the understanding the forces at work in economic relations 
between the majority ethnic group and minority ethnic groups.  We offer an 
alternative story to those currently discussed in the literature, cited above.  In addition 
  23to the policy elements discussed above, the model supports policies emphasizing 
tolerance of cultural differences, while at the same time rejecting policies that 
stigmatize and isolate minority ethnicities. 
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